Private information retrieval (PIR) schemes for coded storage with colluding servers are presented, which are not restricted to maximum distance separable (MDS) codes. PIR schemes for general linear codes are constructed, and the resulting PIR rate is calculated explicitly. It is shown that codes with transitive automorphism groups yield the highest possible rates obtainable with the proposed scheme. In the special case of no server collusion, this rate coincides with the known asymptotic PIR capacity for MDS-coded storage systems. While many PIR schemes in the literature require field sizes that grow with the number of servers and files in the system, we focus especially on the case of a binary base field, for which Reed-Muller codes serve as an important and explicit class of examples. , 4} of C. As infomation sets of C ⊥ = (C D) ⊥ we use J 1 = {1, 2, 3, 5, 10} J 2 = {2, 3, 4, 6, 11} J 3 = {3, 4, 5, 7, 16} J 4 = {4, 5, 6, 9, 1} J 5 = {5, 6, 7, 10, 2} . . . J 11 = {16, 1, 2, 4, 9}.
I. INTRODUCTION P RIVATE information retrieval (PIR) seeks to retrieve data from a database without disclosing information about the identity of the data items retrieved, and was introduced by Chor et al. [1] , [2] . The classic PIR model of Chor et al. [2] views the database as an m-bit binary string x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ {0, 1} m , and assumes that the user wants to retrieve a single bit x i without revealing any information about the index i . The PIR rate, or simply rate, of a PIR scheme is measured as the ratio of the gained information over the downloaded information, while upload costs of the requests are usually ignored. The trivial solution of downloading the entire database is the only way to guarantee informationtheoretic privacy in the case of a single server [2] , but replicating the database onto k servers that do not communicate can significantly increase the rate, as in [2] [3] [4] and the references therein.
Shah et al. [5] recently introduced a model of PIR for coded data. Here, all files are distributed over the servers according to a storage code. It is shown in [5] that for a suitably constructed storage code, privacy can be guaranteed by downloading a single bit more than the size of the desired file. However, this requires exponentially many servers in terms of the number of files. Blackburn et al. [6] achieved the same low download complexity with a linear number of servers, but this is still far from applicable storage systems where the number of files tends to dwarf the number of servers.
Modern distributed storage systems require communication between servers to recover data in the case of node failure. As such, it is natural in a PIR scheme to allow the servers to collude, that is, to assume the servers inform each other of their interaction with the user. Explicit PIR schemes for coded storage and colluding servers were previously considered in [7] [8] [9] . The most common collusion model is that of t-collusion, wherein one assumes that every subset of servers of size t can collude. The corresponding PIR scheme in this case is called a t-private information retrieval scheme.
The maximum possible rate, or capacity of a PIR scheme for a replicated storage system was derived in [10] without collusion and in [11] with collusion. The corresponding PIR capacity of an MDS-coded storage system was given in [12] , in the case of no colluding servers. The PIR capacity of MDS-coded storage systems with colluding servers is only known for some particular sets of parameters [13] . Kumar et al. [14] consider PIR from non-MDS coded non-colluding storage systems for the first time, and show how to achieve good PIR rates for systems with non-MDS storage codes. For certain examples of non-MDS storage codes, the authors construct a PIR scheme with rate equal to that of an analogous scheme for MDS storage codes with the same code rate. To the best of our knowledge, PIR capacity expressions for non-MDS coded storage have not been discussed in the literature.
A. Main Contributions
While explicit PIR schemes which achieve capacity are constructed in [10] [11] [12] , they require the base field to be large. 0018 -9448 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
If n is the number of servers and M is the number of files, the capacity-achieving schemes of [11] require a field size of q = O(n M ), since they rely on the existence of MDS codes of high lengths. Realistic storage systems, however, may operate over fields of small size to keep the complexity of the involved operations manageable. One would naturally then like to construct explicit PIR schemes over small base fields. In this work we construct PIR schemes based on general linear codes, and concentrate in particular on binary Reed-Muller (RM) codes. The schemes described in [8] employed Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, and the resulting analysis of the achievable rate relied on the star product C D of two GRS codes C and D again being a GRS code. The class of RM codes is closed under the star product operation as well, and thus naturally lends itself to be employed using the PIR scheme of Freij-Hollanti et al. [8] . However, RM codes have the advantage of being defined over the binary field F 2 . When comparing GRS and RM codes of equal length and dimension, it is shown here that the same PIR rates as with GRS codes can be achieved in the non-colluding case. For a fixed PIR rate, however, RM codes provide less protection against collusion due to their lower minimum distance. Nevertheless, it is shown that the t-PIR RM schemes presented here still provide protection against a substantial fraction of colluding sets of sizes slightly bigger than t.
If C is a linear code, we let d C denote its minimum distance and dim(C) denote its dimension. The definition of the star product C D of two linear codes C and D is given below in Definition 4 of Section II. In detail, the main contributions of this paper are:
• Given an arbitrary storage code C and retrieval code D, Theorem 2 constructs a PIR scheme with rate (d CD − 1)/n which protects against (d D ⊥ − 1)-collusion, where n is the length of C and D (and equal to the number of servers in the system). This is a small generalization of the main theorem of [8] , which proves the same result but with mild conditions on the codes C and D. • For some classes of C and D, and in particular when C and C D have transitive automorphism groups, Theorems 3 and 4 improve the above construction to one which achieves a PIR rate of dim(C D) ⊥ /n, the maximum possible for the presented scheme. This also coincides with the asymptotic PIR capacity in the non-colluding case (in which D is the repetition code), see [15] and the below discussion. • We apply our construction to the case when C and D are binary Reed-Muller codes, resulting in a large class of PIR schemes defined over F 2 for coded storage systems with colluding servers. • As a corollary of these results, we also improve on the PIR rates of some of the distributed storage systems studied in [14] .
B. Comparison With Related Work
Within days of the original posting of this work on ArXiv, the independent work [16] was also posted, an extension of [14] containing several results parallel to those in the current paper. Kumar et al. [16] make a detailed study of [n, k] storage codes which are "MDS-PIR capacity-achieving", that is, those storage codes for which there exists a PIR scheme with rate (1 − k/n)/(1 − (k/n) M ), which is the PIR capacity of MDS-coded storage systems [12] . Kumar et al. [16] also construct PIR schemes for the case of coded storage with colluding servers with a rate expression resembling that found in the current work. On the other hand, we focus less on capacity results and more on explicit scheme constructions for systems which have non-trivial server collusion in the asymptotic regime where M → ∞.
As for a more specific comparison with [16] , in the case of no server collusion and an arbitrary storage code C, our Theorem 2 specializes to a PIR scheme with rate (d C − 1)/n, while [16, Corollary 2] constructs a PIR scheme whose rate is lower bounded by min{k, d C − 1}/n as M → ∞. Our Theorem 4 and [16, Th. 8] both show that optimal rates can be obtained for storage codes with transitive automorphism groups, though the result of [16, Th. 8 ] is a slightly looser condition than transitivity. Both our Theorem 3 and the protocol presented in [16, Sec. VIII] make similar studies of information sets of the involved linear codes to optimize the PIR rate. Both our Corollary 3 and [16, Corollary 11] show that if the storage code C and retrieval code D are Reed-Muller codes, then one can achieve a PIR rate of dim(C D) ⊥ /n. Lastly, the schemes presented here require a larger number of iterations and more striping than those of [16] , but our Example 8 shows that this can almost certainly be improved. Lastly, we point out that in the subsequent work [15] , Kumar et al. [16] show that the PIR capacity of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes is equal to the MDS-PIR capacity, that is, they establish that (1 − k/n)/(1 − (k/n) M ) is in fact an upper bound on the supremum of all possible PIR rates for such codes [15, Th. 4] . Thus the scheme of the current work is asymptotically capacity-achieving when there is no server collusion.
As for other related work, RM codes have previously been considered for PIR in other settings [17] . There, the system model is different from the present paper, in that the coding is between different files and the primary goal is to minimize storage overhead for a given PIR scheme, along the same lines as in [18] . In our work, coding is between different blocks of the same file, and the goal is to minimize the download overhead for fixed storage codes.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I-D, we introduce the standard system model of PIR for coded storage, including the notion of server collusion. Sections II-A and II-B recall the star product scheme from [8] , and it is shown that we can always achieve a PIR rate of (d CD − 1)/n while protecting against (d D ⊥ − 1)-collusion, for any linear codes C and D. In Section II-C, we increase the rate of our star product schemes via a careful study of the combinatorics of information sets of the storage and retrieval codes. As a corollary of this, we reproduce and improve upon results of [14] for some specific storage codes.
In Section II-D, we show that when the codes C and C D have transitive automorphism groups, then the PIR rate can be further increased from (d CD − 1)/n to dim(C D) ⊥ /n. Section III instantiates our results in the case when the storage and retrieval codes are both binary Reed Muller codes. For such codes, explicit trade-offs between storage rate and PIR rate are derived. Section IV concludes the paper.
D. Introduction to Private Information Retrieval for Coded Storage
Let us describe the distributed storage systems we consider; this setup follows that of [7] , [8] , and [12] . To provide clear and concise notation, we have consistently used superscripts to refer to files or parts of files, superscripts in parenthesis to refer to iterations of an algorithm, subscripts to refer to servers, and parenthetical indices for entries of a vector. Hence, for example, the query q
is sent to the j th server in the γ th iteration when downloading the w-th file. In general, we denote the file we wish to download by x [w] , while we denote an arbitrary file in the system by x i . We denote by F an arbitrary finite field, of unspecified size except when explicitly stated.
Suppose we have files x 1 , . . . , x M ∈ F b×k . The considered data storage scheme proceeds by arranging the files into a bM × k matrix
Each file x i is encoded using a linear [n, k, d C ]-code C having generator matrix G C , into an encoded file y i = x i G C ∈ F b×n . In matrix form, we encode the matrix X into a matrix Y by right-multiplying by G C :
The j th column y j ∈ F bM×1 of the matrix Y is stored by the j th server. Such a storage system can tolerate up to any d C −1 servers failing. If C is an MDS code, the resulting distributed storage system is maximally robust against server failure.
The following defines precisely what we mean by a PIR scheme; for simplicity we have limited ourselves to simple linear schemes, which suffices to describe all the schemes constructed in this paper. For convenience, we use the notation [n] = {1, . . . , n} for any positive integer n throughout the paper.
Definition 1 [8, Definition 4] : Suppose we have a distributed storage system Y = X G C as above, where M files are stored across n servers. A PIR scheme for such a storage system consists of: [8, Definition 5] : The PIR rate of a PIR scheme is defined to be bk ns . In the above, we view b and s as parameters that we are free to vary to enable the user to download exactly one file; see Theorem 1 below and the following discussion.
Definition 3: We call a set T ⊆ [n] a colluding set if it is possible for the servers indexed by T to share their quaries in an attempt to deduce the index of the requested file. A PIR scheme protects against the colluding set
T denotes the joint distribution of all tuples
j t } of queries sent to the servers in T over all s iterations of the PIR scheme, and I (· ; ·) denotes the mutual information of two random variables. In other words, there exists a probability distribution (Q T , μ T ) such that, for all w ∈ [M], the projection of (Q [w] , μ [w] ) to the coordinates in T is (Q T , μ T ).
If a PIR scheme protects against all colluding sets T of size ≤ t, we say it protects against t-collusion.
Stated somewhat less formally, if a PIR scheme protects against the colluding set T , the servers in T will not learn anything about the index w of the file that is being requested, even after sharing their quaries with each other.
For the rest of this paper we exclusively consider linear schemes that use uniform distributions on the query spaces, as in the following fundamental example.
Example 1: Let n = 2 servers each store a copy of a database x consisting of M files x i ∈ F. To retrieve the w th file the user chooses uniformly at random an element u ∈ F M and constructs the queries as q [w] 
, where e w is the w th standard basis vector of length M. The space of all queries therefore is given by
j · x are calculated as the inner product of the database with the quaries and reconstruction is achieved by subtraction of the responses,
1 . This scheme is secure against either server individually, as both projections of any query space Q [i] onto a coordinate are identical to the complete ambient space F n with uniform measure. It does not, however, protect against 2-collusion, as the two servers can jointly observe the index i by computing the difference of their query vectors.
II. A GENERAL PIR SCHEME FOR CODED DATA STORED OVER COLLUDING SERVERS
In this section, we recall the star product scheme from [8] , and prove that we can always achieve a PIR rate of (d CD − 1)/n while protecting against (d D ⊥ − 1)-collusion, for arbitrary linear codes C and D. We then proceed to show how the rate of our star product schemes can be increased by carefully studying the combinatorics of information sets of the storage and retrieval codes. We also show that when the codes C and C D both have transitive automorphism groups, the PIR rate can be further increased from (d CD − 1)/n to dim(C D) ⊥ /n.
A. Background on Star Product PIR Schemes
In this section we briefly summarize the methods of Freij-Hollanti et al. [8] , which construct explicit PIR schemes for coded data which protect against t-collusion. The crucial ingredients are the storage code C ⊆ F n , another linear code D ⊆ F n used to construct the queries, and the star product C D, the dual of which is used for decoding. We denote by C ⊥ the dual code of C. Let us first recall the definition of the star product (also called Schur or Hadamard product) of two codes.
Definition 4: Let C and D be linear codes of length n over F. We define their star product C D to be
where c d is the star product of vectors, i.e., component-wise product of the vectors c and d. The star product C D is again a linear code of length n by definition.
Recall that an information set of an [n, k]-code is a subset of [n] of size k, corresponding to an invertible submatrix of the generator matrix of the code. The main theorem of [8] is the following:
Theorem 1 [8] : Let C ⊆ F n be an [n, k, d C ] linear storage code and let D ⊆ F n be a linear code such that either (i) d CD − 1 ≤ k, or (ii) there exists J ⊆ [n] of size d CD − 1 such that every subset of J of size k is an information set of C. Then there exists a linear PIR scheme for the distributed
Let us recall how one iteration of the scheme works in the simple case where each file consists of b = 1 row, that is,
To privately retrieve a wanted file x [w] , for every file x i in the database a codeword d i is chosen uniformly at random from the code D ⊆ F n . A vector e ∈ F n \ D is then added to d w . The query q [w] j ∈ F 1×M sent to the j th server is then
and the servers respond with
The support of e is chosen so that right-multiplying the vector
n with the parity check matrix of C D reveals d CD −1 coordinates of y [w] , coming from the C e summand in the above expression. The scheme protects against (d D ⊥ − 1)-collusion because every t = d D ⊥ − 1 columns of the generator matrix of D (which is a parity check matrix of D ⊥ ) are linearly independent, hence the joint distribution of the queries at any t servers is the uniform distribution on (F M ) t .
More generally, suppose we want to download a file x [w] ∈ F b×k . We denote the encoded version by
be a linear code, and let E = (e (1) , . . . , e (s) ) ∈ (F b×n ) s be selected such that the composed map
j ∈ F 1×b denotes the j th row of e (γ ) . The three maps in (4) should be interpreted as encoding, receiving responses, and decoding, respectively.
The PIR scheme proceeds as follows: 1) Select Msb codewords independently and uniformly at random from D:
2) For γ = 1, . . . , s, send the query
to (C D) ⊥ , via right-multiplying with the matrix H . We refer to this as a (D, E)-retrieval scheme. By injectivity of (4), this scheme retrieves the file x [w] from ns queries. It protects against the colluding set T if e
Example 2: Suppose that 1 ≤ t ≤ n − k. By choosing C and D to both be generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes with the same evaluation vector, the (D, E)-retrieval scheme of [8] can achieve a PIR rate of n−(k+t −1) n while protecting against t-collusion. See [8] for more details. 
B. Star Product Schemes for Non-MDS Coded Data
To apply the above PIR scheme in our current setting, we need to generalize Theorem 1 by removing the assumption on the set J , since such a set does not in general exist when C and D are not MDS codes. To prove the general theorem, we will need the following lemma:
Proof: Start with an arbitrary information set S 1 . We will construct disjoint information sets S 1 , . . . , S d C / k , each of size k, as follows. Inductively, for 1 ≤ i < d C /k, consider the code C projected to the complement of S 1 ∪ · · · ∪ S i . This projection has dimension k, since C can correct ik ≤ d C − 1 erasures. Thus, there will be an information set in the remaining coordinates, which we choose as S i+1 .
We can now prove the following generalization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: Let C ⊆ F n be an [n, k, d C ] linear storage code and let D ⊆ F n be any linear code. Then there exists a (D, E)-retrieval scheme for the distributed storage system Y = X G C with PIR rate (d CD − 1)/n which protects against
Proof: Let x [w] denote the file we wish to download. Set c := d CD − 1 ≤ d C − 1. Let us first suppose that c ≤ k. Choose an information set S ⊆ [n] of C; after relabeling the storage nodes we may assume S = {1, . . . , k}. Let the files be spread over b rows, i.e. x i ∈ F b×k for all i , where b = lcm(c, k)/k. We use s = lcm(c, k)/c iterations of the scheme on the information set S as follows. Let a = c/b. During the γ th iteration of the PIR scheme, for each β ∈ [b] we download (by putting a 1 in the corresponding coordinate of e (γ ) j ) the β th entry from each of the vectors
, where all indices are computed modulo k. One can check easily that after s iterations, we have downloaded k unique symbols from each row of the encoded file, which suffices to reconstruct the desired file since S is an information set. The resulting PIR rate is easily seen to be bk ns = c/n, as desired. See Fig. 1 for an illustration of which symbols are downloaded from y [w] during which iteration when c = 4 and k = 6. Now suppose that c ≥ k and write c = g · k +c with 0 ≤ c < k. Ifc = 0, then since c = d CD − 1 ≤ d C − 1, Lemma 1 guarantees that we can find g = c/k disjoint information sets S 1 , . . . , S g of C. In this case we can download the full k information symbols from each of the c/k information sets, using a different row of the file for each information set.
Thus whenc = 0 the scheme is essentially complete; each file x i ∈ F b×k requires b = g rows and the scheme requires s = 1 iteration.
Lastly, suppose that 0 <c < k. Again by Lemma 1 there exist g + 1 = c/k disjoint information sets S 1 , . . . , S g+1 of C. Every iteration of the PIR scheme, we download k symbols from each of S 1 , . . . , S g as in the previous paragraph, and an additionalc < k symbols from the last information set S g+1 . Lettingb = lcm(c, k)/k and s = lcm(c, k)/c we download from S g+1 as in the case c < k, usingb rows of the desired file and s repetitions of the scheme. A file x i ∈ F b×k now consists of b = g · s +b rows, divided into s rows for each information set S 1 , . . . , S g andb for the last information set S g+1 . This completes the scheme construction. The PIR rate is clearly c/n. Now consider a set T of size t = d D ⊥ − 1. In each iteration, the query restricted to T is a uniformly random element in F t ×bM , as the code D has full rank on T . Moreover, the sources of randomness in different iterations of the scheme are independent. Thus, the queries that T observes throughout the course of the PIR scheme are uniformly random on F t ×bM s , and hence do not depend on the desired file. This proves that the scheme protects against t-collusion.
Remark 1: The construction contained in the above proof essentially gives a method for extending an incomplete PIR scheme which downloads d CD −1 ≤ d C −1 encoded symbols, one from each of a set of d CD − 1 servers, into a proper PIR scheme which can download a whole file with PIR rate (d CD − 1)/n.
C. Improving the PIR Rate of Star Product Schemes
The (D, E)-retrieval scheme of Theorem 2 essentially projects a vector of weight ≤ d CD −1 onto the space (CD) ⊥ , and takes advantage of the fact that any such vector can be recovered from this projection. However, if we choose the vectors e (γ ) j more carefully, we can in principle recover some dim(C D) ⊥ ≥ d CD − 1 coordinates of y [w] . Reed-Muller codes are in general not MDS, and hence this inequality will usually be strict, allowing us to increase the PIR rate of our retrieval scheme.
The following generalization of our Theorem 2 allows us to increase the PIR rate of (D, E)-retrieval schemes as described above, for certain choices of C and D. While the technical conditions to be checked to invoke the theorem are somewhat cumbersome, they are stated this way to somewhat axiomatize an approach to constructing many (D, E)-retrieval schemes with high rate.
Theorem 3: Consider an [n, k, d C ] linear storage code C and any length n linear code D. Assume that there exist (not necessarily distinct) subsets S 1 , . . . , S b and J 1 , . . . , J s of [n] such that:
(i) S β is an information set of C for β = 1, . . . , b.
(ii) J γ is contained in an information set of (C D) ⊥ for γ = 1, . . . , s.
where # A denotes the size of a set A. Then there exists a (D, E)-retrieval scheme for the distributed storage system Y = X G C with PIR rate bk ns which protects against (d D ⊥ − 1)collusion. In particular, if all the sets J γ have the same cardinality c, then the PIR rate is c/n. Proof: Recall that a file x [w] we wish to download has dimension b × k. We will download the β th row of x [w] via the information set S β for 1 ≤ β ≤ b, and in the γ th iteration, we will download one symbol from each column in J γ for 1 ≤ γ ≤ s.
Fix an iteration γ , and inductively, assume we have defined the matrices e (γ ) for all γ < γ . For j ∈ J γ , let β j ∈ [b] be the smallest index such that j ∈ S β j and e (γ )β j j = 0 for all γ < γ (note that β j depends on γ ). Now define the n × b matrix
By (6) j ∈ F 1×b denote the j th row of e (γ ) . If j ∈ J γ , this is a standard basis vector with a 1 in the β th j position, and if j ∈ J γ , this is the zero vector. Recall that the encoded version of x [w] is denoted by
During the γ th iteration, the relevant part of the total response as in (5) is of the form e (γ )
By construction, we have
where
The assumption that J γ is contained in an information set of (C D) ⊥ implies that we can recover all of the |J γ | non-zero entries {y [w] j (β j ) : j ∈ J γ } of the vector in (8) after right-multiplying the responses with the parity-check matrix of C D.
So in the γ th iteration, we download y [w] j (β j ) for each j ∈ J γ , and after all iterations we have downloaded y [w] j (β) for all j ∈ S β and all β ∈ [b]. Since S β is an information set of C, this allows us to recover the preimage
, for all β. Thus, the chain in (4) is injective, so E = (e (1) , . . . e (s) ) satisfies the criteria for the (D, E)-scheme to download the file x w . The scheme is again easily seen to have rate bk ns and protect against (d D ⊥ − 1)-collusion.
One can easily deduce Theorem 2 as a corollary of Theorem 3 by setting c = d CD − 1 ≤ d C − 1. Indeed, by Lemma 1, the code C has at least b = c/k disjoint information sets S 0 , . . . , S b −1 . Let b = cb , and let S β = S β (mod b ) for 0 ≤ β ≤ b−1 (for notational convenience, in this argument we index rows and iterations starting at 0). After relabeling the servers, we can assume that S 0 ∪ · · · ∪ S b −1 = {1, . . . , kb }. Let s = kb , and for γ = 0, . . . , s − 1, let J γ = {γ + 1, . . . , γ + c}, where in J γ a server index j is to be understood as j (mod s) + 1. Clearly, every element j ∈ [s] is in precisely c sets S β , and in precisely c sets J γ . As every set of size c < d CD is contained in an information set of (C D) ⊥ , Theorem 2 follows immediately.
On the other hand, a fundamental upper bound on the download rate of a (D, E) PIR scheme is dim(C D) ⊥ /n, as in each iteration we are downloading a projection to the space (C D) ⊥ . So for every possible choice of C and D, the maximal possible download rate of a (D, E)-PIR scheme lies between (d CD − 1)/n and dim(C D) ⊥ /n. We will show in the coming sections that for a very significant class of codes, including Reed-Muller codes, we can always download at rate dim(C D) ⊥ /n. Corollary 1: With C and D as in Theorem 3, suppose there exists an information set S of C such that every subset of S of size dim(C D) ⊥ is an information set of (C D) ⊥ . Then we can achieve a PIR rate of dim(C D) ⊥ /n while protecting against (d D ⊥ − 1)-collusion.
Proof: We take the collection J 1 , . . . , J s to be all of the subsets of S of size c = dim(C D) ⊥ , so that s = k c . It follows immediately that every j ∈ S is contained in exactly b = c k c /k of the subsets J γ . Now set S 1 = S 2 = · · · = S b = S. The conditions of Theorem 3 are clearly satisfied, hence the result.
Kumar et al. [14] study PIR for storage codes C with code rate greater than 1/2, with no server collusion. We can apply Corollary 1 to some of the example codes they study, to obtain PIR rates which match or improve on the rates in [14] .
Example 3: In this example we let t = 1, so that we protect against no non-trivial server collusion. In this case D is the repetition code over F 2 , hence we have C D = C. Let C be the [5, 3, 2] 2 code C 1 from [14] , defined by the parity-check matrix
The corresponding generator matrix in systematic form is
Let S = {1, 2, 3} be the systematic information set of C. Every 2-subset of S is clearly an information set of C ⊥ , so Corollary 1 gives a PIR rate of 2/5, the same as obtained in [14] . Note that using Theorem 2, we would have only achieved a PIR rate of 1/5. We will now go through the construction of a PIR scheme for this example step by step to illustrate the proof of Theorem 3, in the case that b = 1. We set J 1 = {1, 2}, J 2 = {1, 3} and J 3 = {2, 3} as the subsets of S of cardinality 2, each an information set of C ⊥ . Then we define the error vectors/ matrices e (1) 
with which we construct our queries. The corresponding relevant parts of the responses (i.e., after right-multiplying with G C ⊥ ) are
3 , 0, 0).
Since we used a systematic encoder, we have y
i for i = 1, 2, 3, therefore we can recover any two information symbols in one of the three iterations. Example 4: Similarly to the previous example, let C be the [11, 6, 4] 2 code C 2 from [14] , defined by the parity-check matrix Using G C ⊥ , one checks that every 5-subset of the information set S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 10} of C is an information set of C ⊥ , yielding a PIR rate of 5/11. This improves on the PIR rate of 4/11 achieved in [14] (itself an improvement over the PIR rate of (d C − 1)/n = 3/11 achieved by Theorem 2) .
As the next example shows, the requirement that every subset of S is an information set of (C D) ⊥ is too strict, and sometimes we can achieve the same optimal rates by imposing less symmetry. The following example illustrates this principle when D = Rep(n).
Example 5: Consider the code C 3 of [14] , the [12, 8, 4] 11 Pyramid code from [19] . With a generator matrix as in [19, Sec. 2.2] , let S be the information set S = {1, . . . , 8} of C, and let J be the information set J = {1, 2, 3, 5} of C ⊥ . Define the collection J = {{1, 2, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 4, 6}, . . . , {8, 1, 2, 4}} (10) of all "cyclic shifts" of J within S. One can check that every element of J is an information set of C ⊥ . An argument similar to the proof of Corollary 1 (we omit the details) shows that we can achieve a PIR rate of 4/12 = dim(C ⊥ )/n, the same as obtained in [14] . Similarly, consider the code C = C 4 of [14] , a [16, 10, 5] 16 locally repairable code from [20] . Defining C via the generator matrix from [20, eq. (7) ], one can compute that the information set S = {1, . . . , 10} of C and the subset J = {1, . . . , 6} have the property that every cyclic shift of J within S is an information set of C ⊥ . Again we achieve a PIR rate of 6/16 = dim(C ⊥ )/n, an improvement of the rate of 5/16 obtained in [14] (itself an improvement over 4/16, the rate obtained using Theorem 2) .
Note that in each of the four above example codes, we obtain a PIR rate of dim(C ⊥ )/n, the maximum possible for a (Rep(n), E) retrieval scheme for the distributed storage system Y = X G C . In the next section, we show that if C and C D are transitive codes, we can always find a (D, E) retrieval scheme which achieves the upper bound of dim(C D) ⊥ /n.
D. PIR Schemes From Transitive Codes
We denote the symmetric group of n elements by S n .  For c = (c 1 , . . . c n ) ∈ F n and σ ∈ S n , define σ (c) = (c σ (1) , . . . , c σ (n) ) ∈ F n . This clearly defines a group action of S n on F n . If C is a linear code and σ ∈ S n is such that σ (c) ∈ C for every c ∈ C, then σ is said to be a permutation automorphism, or simply an automorphism, of C. The automorphisms of C form a subgroup (C) ⊆ S n . We note that every σ ∈ (C) maps information sets of C into information sets. Moreover, note that for any code C we have
Lemma 2: Let G and H be any two transitive subgroups of S n , and let S and J be any two non-empty subsets of [n]. Then there exist collections S = {S β } and J = {J γ } of (not necessarily distinct) subsets of [n] , such that
Proof: Since G is transitive the number of sets in the orbit G · S that contain a given element in [n] is x = |G||S| n , and hence independent of the chosen element. Analogously each element appears in y = |H ||J | n sets of the orbit H · J . Let α, β be chosen such that lcm(x, y) = αx = βy, then we see that the collection S containing α copies of the orbit G · S and the collection J containing β copies of the orbit H · J both contain each element of [n] in exactly lcm(x, y) of their sets.
Theorem 4: Let C and D be codes of length n such that (C) and (C D) are transitive on [n] . Then there is a (D, E)-retrieval scheme for the distributed storage system Y = X G C with PIR rate dim(C D) ⊥ /n which protects against (d D ⊥ − 1)-collusion.
Proof: We apply Lemma 2 with G = (C), H = ((C D) ⊥ ), S an information set of C, and J an information set of (C D) ⊥ . Let S and J be as in the lemma, and note that every S β ∈ S is an information set of C, and every J γ ∈ J is an information set of (C D) ⊥ . Thus, the collections of information sets S and J satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 3. As each of the sets J γ has cardinallity dim(C D) ⊥ , it follows that the PIR rate of the scheme in Theorem 3 is dim(C D) ⊥ /n.
Note that when using Theorem 4 to construct a PIR scheme, the resulting number of rows per file and iterations can be calculated with the notation of Lemma 2 as b = α|G| and s = β|H |, respectively.
III. REED-MULLER CODES FOR PIR

A. Basic Definitions
In this subsection we define and give some well-known results on Reed-Muller codes. We note that there are various ways to define Reed-Muller codes; for our purposes it is most convenient to view them as evaluation codes from multivariate polynomials.
Definition 5: Let 0 ≤ r ≤ m be integers and let P 1 , . . . , P 2 m be all the points of F m 2 . Let n = 2 m and for f ∈ F 2 [x 1 , . . . , x m ], define eval( f ) = ( f (P 1 ), . . . , f (P n )) ∈ F n 2 . Then the r -th order Reed-Muller code of length n = 2 m , denoted by RM(r, m) , is defined as
We need the following properties of Reed-Muller codes: Lemma 3 [21, Ch. 13] : Reed-Muller codes satisfy the following properties: − 1, m) . To analyze the performance of a PIR scheme which uses Reed-Muller codes, we need to understand the star product of two such codes. The following result is well-known, but for the sake of completeness we provide a short proof. The number of minimal weight codewords of Reed-Muller codes is also known explicitly, and their structural description will be useful when proving quantitative bounds on the amount of collusion that our PIR schemes tolerate.
Lemma 5 [21, Ch. 13, Th. 8] : Let c ∈ RM(r, m) be a codeword of minimal weight and let supp(c) denote its support. Then supp(c) ⊆ F m 2 is an affine subspace of F m 2 of dimension m − r.
The next corollary follows by a simple counting argument. Corollary 2 [21, Ch. 13, Th. 9] : The number of minimal weight codewords in RM(r, m) is
.
B. Achievable PIR Rate With Reed-Muller Codes
We now choose C = RM(r, m) as storage code, so that n = 2 m and k = r i=0 m i . The code D is chosen to be RM(r , m) with r + r ≤ m, a code of the same length, but possibly different dimension. Applying Lemma 4 and Theorem 2, we immediately obtain a (D, E) retrieval scheme for Y = X G C with PIR rate (d CD − 1)/n = (2 m−(r+r ) − 1)/2 m and which protects against d D ⊥ − 1 = 2 r +1 − 1 collusion. However, as the following example illustrates, this naïve approach underestimates the achievable PIR rates when C and D are Reed-Muller codes. RM(1, 4) with generator matrix G C,D = 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 , which is used to encode files x i ∈ F 1×5 2 . We have C D = RM (2, 4) , which has parity-check matrix H CD = G C,D and minimum distance 2 4−2 = 4. Hence we can achieve a PIR rate of 3/16 and protect against 3-collusion.
We can improve to a PIR rate of dim(C D) ⊥ /n = 5/16 as follows. If we choose e to be any vector of weight 5 whose support corresponds to an invertible submatrix of H CD = G C,D , then we can download all of x [w] . For example, if we choose e = (1110100010000000), then a simple computation reveals that
from which we can recover the whole file x [w] ∈ F 1×5 2 by the invertibility of the above 5 × 5 matrix.
The previous example generalizes to the following result, which illustrates that with Reed-Muller codes, we can always achieve the upper bound dim(C D) ⊥ /n for (D, E) retrieval schemes.
Corollary 3: Let C = RM(r, m) and let 0 ≤ r < m − r. Then there exists a (D, E)-retrieval scheme for the distributed storage system Y = X G C with a PIR rate of
which protects against (2 r +1 − 1)-collusion. Proof: Let D = RM(r , m), so that C D = RM(r + r , m). By Theorem 4, it is enough to show that (RM(r, m) ) and (RM(r + r , m)) are transitive on the ground sets of the codes. Now note that the ground set of RM(r, m) is F m 2 , and affine transformations of F m 2 preserve the class of polynomials of degree ≤ r . Thus, the affine transformations of F m 2 are automorphisms of RM(r, m) and RM(r + r , m). Since the affine transformations act transitvely on F m 2 , so do the automorphism groups (RM(r, m) ) and (RM(r + r , m) ). By Theorem 4, there is a (D, E)-retrieval scheme for the distributed storage system Y = X G C with PIR rate dim(CD) ⊥ /n which protects against all colluding sets of size d D ⊥ − 1 = 2 r +1 − 1. The result follows.
In Figure 2 we use Corollary 3 to plot the resulting PIR rates of systems in which both C and D are Reed-Muller codes. In the left-hand plot, we see the asymptotic behavior of the PIR rate for storage codes with code rate 1/2, as the number of servers increases. In the right-hand plot, we fix a system with n = 64 servers and observe how the tradeoff between the storage code rate and the PIR rate varies as we increase the amount of server collusion.
Example 7: Suppose that C = RM(0, 4) = Rep(16) 2 , so that data is stored via a replication system over n = 16 servers. Set D = RM (1, 4) , which is a [16, 5, 8] 2 -code. Fig. 2 . Above, we plot the PIR rate for binary RM storage codes (solid) and GRS storage codes (dashed with corresponding color) of fixed code rate 1/2, as a function of the length of the storage code. Note that the PIR rates agree in the case of no collusion. Below, we plot the PIR rate versus the storage code rate for binary RM storage codes (solid) and GRS storage codes (dashed) of fixed length 64, as a function of the storage code rate.
Then (C D) ⊥ = D ⊥ = RM (2, 4) , which is a [16, 11, 4] 2code. The PIR scheme of Theorem 2 achieves a PIR rate of 7/16 and protects against all colluding sets of size 2 1+1 − 1 = 3. With the scheme of Corollary 3, we have a (D, E)retrieval scheme with PIR rate 11/16, which is a substantial improvement.
Remark 2: Using the scheme of [8] with C = Rep(16) q and D a [16, 3, 14] q -GRS code, one can protect against 3-collusion while achieving a PIR rate of (n − t)/n = 13/16. If we on the other hand fix the PIR rate to be 11/16 and compare the privacy properties of the schemes in [8] and the above example, the scheme of [8] achieves this rate by keeping C = Rep(16) q and setting D to be a GRS code with parameters [16, 5, 12] q . Then D ⊥ is GRS with parameters [16, 11, 6] q , and hence we protect against 5-collusion. These improvements in either PIR rate or privacy require a field size of q ≥ 16, while the Reed-Muller scheme is defined over F 2 .
On a more general note, a binary PIR scheme can also be set up with a GRS code over F 2 h for some integer h > 1, where every symbol from F 2 h is represented as an element in F h 2 . However, one can easily check that the performance of these codes in terms of protection against colluding sets and PIR rate is poor. For example, consider C = Rep(16) 2 as above and D the binary expansion of an [4, 1, 4]-GRS code over F 4 , which is a [16, 4, 4] -code over F 2 . This scheme has a PIR rate of 3/16 and only protects against 1-collusion. The Reed-Muller PIR scheme which sets D = RM (1, 4) is clearly preferable to this one.
Using Corollary 3 to construct PIR schemes for arbitrary Reed-Muller codes involves computing the orbits of information sets of C and (C D) ⊥ under the respective automorphism groups, and when applied directly may result in schemes which demand large numbers of rows per file and iterations. However, as the following example shows, one can sometimes achieve the same rates with arguments similar to Corollary 1 and the subsequent examples.
Example 8: Consider a system with no server collusion and let C = RM (2, 4) , which is defined by the parity-check matrix (1, 4) respectively, and Aff denotes the affine group. These information sets have size |S| = 11 and |J | = 5, and straightforward calculations show that they are stabilized by subgroups of order 5! = 120 of Aff(F 4 2 ), which has order 322560. Thus, a naïve application of Corollary 3 would require b = 5 · 322560/120 = 13440 blocks per file and s = 11 · 322560/120 = 29568 iterations. Now, let S be the information set S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 , 16} of C and consider the subset J = {1, 2, 3, 5, 10}. Let J be the collection of all cyclic shifts of J within S. One checks using G C ⊥ that every subset of J is an information set of C ⊥ . Hence we can achieve a PIR rate of 5/16 = dim(C ⊥ )/n, when setting b = 5 and s = 11. (The construction of the actual PIR scheme, illustrating the proof of Theorem 3 in the case b = 5, can be found in the appendix.) This shows that a careful analysis of the information sets of the storage and retrieval codes can significantly improve the practicality of our schemes.
C. Protection Against t-Collusion
When t ≥ d D ⊥ , the Reed-Muller PIR scheme does not protect against all t-colluding sets of servers. However, for t ≈ d D ⊥ , it does protect against "most" t-colluding sets in the following sense.
Proposition 1: Let D = RM(r, m), and let
Let T ⊆ F m 2 be a set of |T | = t servers, chosen uniformly at random. Then the probability that the PIR scheme does not protect against collusion in T is bounded from above by
. If t < 3 · 2 r , then this bound is tight.
Proof: We fail to protect against a colluding set T if and only if dim(D| T ) < |T |. This latter condition is equivalent to the existence of a codeword of D ⊥ whose support is contained in T .
By Corollary 2, there are 2 m−r−1 r i=0 (2 m−i −1) r i=0 (2 r+1−i −1) minimal weight codewords in D ⊥ . Each of these minimal codewords has its support contained in exactly 2 m −2 r+1 t −2 r+1 sets of size t, so there exist at most
t-sets that contain the support of some codeword in D ⊥ . For the second statement, notice that by Lemma 5, the support of two minimal weight codewords of D ⊥ intersect in a flat of dimension at most r in F m 2 . Thus, their union has size at least 2 · 2 r+1 − 2 r = 3 · 2 r . As a consequence, if t < 3 · 2 r , then the collections of non-protected sets corresponding to different minimal codewords in D ⊥ are disjoint. Thus, the number of such sets is exactly given by (14) .
Example 9: Continuing Example 7 wherein D = RM (1, 4) , the 4-colluding sets T that we fail to protect against are in bijection with minimal weight codewords of D ⊥ . By Corollary 2 there are 120 minimal weight codewords of D ⊥ . Hence the Reed-Muller PIR scheme protects against collusion for 16 4 − 120 16 4 −1 ≈ 93.4% (15) of subsets of servers of size t = 4.
Similarly, there are 16 5 = 4368 subsets T of servers of size 5, of which 2688 satisfy dim(D| T ) = 5, according to Proposition 1. It follows that the scheme protects against collusion for 2688 4368 ≈ 61.5% of all subsets of servers of size 5.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied PIR schemes for coded storage systems with colluding servers. Given an arbitrary storage code C and retrieval code D, we have constructed a PIR scheme with rate (d CD − 1)/n which protects against (d D ⊥ − 1)collusion, where n is the length of the codes as well as the number of servers in the system. For some classes of C and D, in particular when C and C D have transitive automorphism groups, we have shown that we can improve our scheme to have rate dim(C D) ⊥ /n, the maximum possible for the presented scheme. In particular, this applies when C and D are binary Reed-Muller codes, resulting in a large class of PIR schemes defined over F 2 for coded storage systems with colluding servers. As a corollary of our results, we have improved on the PIR rates of some of the distributed storage systems studied in [14] . The rate dim(CD) ⊥ /n also coincides with the asymptotic PIR capacity in the non-colluding case (t = 1), the query code D then being a repetition code.
Future work will consist of studying other important classes of transitive codes, as well as quantifying achievable PIR rates in terms of the automorphism groups of C and C D. In this work we have focused more on concrete constructions, but understanding the PIR capacity for various models when we limit the field size is a question worth pursuing. Lastly, given a transitive code C, we plan on studying natural conditions on another code D such that CD is also transitive. This may help apply our results to other meaningful classes of codes, such as general evaluation codes and locally repairable codes. Cyclic codes provide an especially encouraging avenue of research, as they are transitive and the class of cyclic codes is closed under the star product.
APPENDIX EXTENDED EXAMPLE 8
To illustrate the proof of Theorem 3 we go through Example 8 step by step. Recall that we have C = RM (2, 4) , which is defined by the parity-check matrix and D = Rep (16) . Therefore, we have C D = C. We use b = 5, i.e., our M files x i are 5 × 11 arrays and a file x i is encoded in a 5 × 16 array y i . To use the notation of (the proof of) Theorem 3, in this example we use the information sets S 1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16} S 2 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16, 1} The corresponding error matrices are Hollanti is an editor of the AIMS Journal on Advances in Mathematics of Communications. She is a recipient of several grants, including five Academy of Finland grants in 2010-2018. In 2014, she received the World Cultural Council Special Recognition Award for young researchers. In 2017, the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters awarded her the Väisälä Prize in Mathematics.
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